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I. - INTRODUCTION 
Employer resistance to workers' demands for better economic and 
social conditions often leads to strike action. This article will discuss 
conditions and events surrounding a strike organized by the Zambia 
National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) which occurred in two phases: May-
June 1968, and June 1970. The first phase lasted for five days, affected 
certain schools only in Copperbelt Province, and was resolved through 
persuasion from the ZNUT leadership following an undertaking by the 
Ministry of Education to meet the teachers' grievances. This phase will be 
discussed briefly to show how eventually it culminated in a countrywide 
strike in June 1970 involving about 20,000 teachers. This second phase 
which lasted for three weeks, had a wider impact and caused a political rift · 
between the Ministry of Education, as the direct employer of the teachers, 
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, which is responsible for 
arbitrating labour disputes. The strained relations between two government 
ministries, in fact, pointed to deeper political strife in the ruling party, 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Political cohesion in the 
country waned because opposition to the UNIP increased, and open sup-
port from other labour organizations for the ZNUT pointed to the possi-
bility of worsening political instability. Simultaneously, the inherited 
colonial class relations were being restructured through the "nationaliza-
tion" of the mining industry in August 1969. Thus, the teachers' strike 
took place at a critical time when the state bureaucrats took political action 
to expand conditions essential to the rise of an indigenous capital-owning 
class. 
The 1970 strike was the subject of a governement board of inquiry 
chaired by Hosea J. Soko, 1 whose report provides much of the evidence in 
* I am grateful to Professor J. Bertin Webster for perceptive comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. This paper was originally presented to a seminar at the Centre 
for African Studies, Dalltousie University, in February 1980, and also read at a conference 
on • 'The Evolving Structure of the Zambian Society", at the University of Edinburgh in May 
1980. I am indebted to both gatherings for various useful comments. 
* * Graduate student, Department of History, Dalhousie University. 
1 H. J. SoKo, chairman, Report of the Board of Inquiry Appointed to Look into 
the Causes and Circumstances Leading to the Existence of a Trade Dispute Between Zambia 
National Union of Teachers and the Ministry of Education (Lusaka: Government Printer, 
1970). Hereafter Soko Board of Inquiry . 
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this paper. The board received written submissions from the ZNUT, the 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), while the Ministry of Education 
reluctantly submitted oral evidence. The board of inquiry was circum-
scribed in its investigations because the ZNUT banned its members from 
giving individual evidence, which forced the board to confine itself to 
Lusaka rather than tour the whole country. The prohibition was meant to 
give the ZNUT leadership direct access to the evidence about the 
teachers' grievances, and to avoid possibilities of dividing the union as its 
president had been appointed to sit on the board despite ZNUT's objec-
tions. To protest against what they saw as government designs to manipu-
late the teachers, the ZNUT suspended their president. This restriction un-
dermined the credibility of the board's report as a source of evidence for 
scholarly data. In order to overcome this bias, the writer interviewed some 
ZNUT leaders who were at the centre of the negotiations that ended the 
strike. 2 The interviews were informal but thematically structured in the 
hope of increasing control over the evidence. Arrangements to interview a 
larger number of teachers were unsuccessful as many of them did not re-
spond, while the others referred the writer to the ZNUT leaders. This 
source was broadened by the use of newspapers in which views of junior 
ZNUT leaders and ordinary members were reported. Although the data on 
which this study is based are incomplete and fragmentary , the very signifi-
cant economic and political changes taking place in Zambia at that time 
justify an initial study of the only group in the public sector which was 
unionized before 1970. 
Hitherto , research on workers' struggles in Zambia has focused solely 
on the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ). 3 Studies of the MUZ have 
examined the relationships between the MUZ and the employers of mine-
workers , the nationalist movement in Zambia, and the state. Three major 
characteristics of these relationships have been identified. First, workers 
pioneered methods of mass confrontation against employers and the 
colonial administration before the emergence of nationalist parties in 
future Zambia. Second, such confrontation aimed at improving the welfare 
of workers and initially lacked a formal union structure. Third, when trade 
unions were formed, workers sought and defended their autonomy from 
political organizations and the state before and after Zambia's political 
independence. This behaviour of organized labour reflected the general 
2 Interviews with B.P.S. Kapini, ZNUT Headquarters, Lusaka, 15 November 1975: 
Newstead Zimba, ZCTU Headquarters, Kitwe, 8 August 1979. 
3 See, for example , several articles by I. HENDERSON, "Pre-nationalist Resistance 
to Colonial Rule in Zambia", African Social Research , 9 (June 1970) : 669-87 ; " Wage-
earners and Political Protest in Colonial Mrica: The Case of the Copperbelt", African 
Affairs, 72 (July 1973) : 288-99; "The Economic Origins of Decolonization in Zambia, 
1940-45" , Rhodesian History, 5 (1975) : 49-67; "Early African Leadership: The Copperbelt 
Disturbances of 1935 and 1940", Journal of Southern African Studies, 2 (1975) : 83-97 ; "The 
Origins of Nationalism in East and Central Mrica: The Zambian Case" , Journal of African 
History , 11 (1970) : 591-603 ; R. H. BATES, Unionisation, Parties and Political Development : 
A Study of Mineworkers in Zambia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) ; Party-
Union Relations in the Copperbelt of Zambia (Cambridge, Mass. : Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, n.d .) ; and M. BuRAWOY, "Another Look at the Mineworker", African 
Social Research , 14: 239-87. 
A CHAPTER IN ZAMBIA'S LABOUR HISTORY 487 
philosophy on which trade unions among Mrican workers were created 
by colonial administrations in African-British colonies. Our understanding 
of the changing perspectives of the relationship between the workers 
and the state, and among the workers in Zambia, will be enhanced by 
extending beyond the mining studies to other industrial and white-collar 
workers. 
This article on the teachers is intended to fill some of these gaps. It 
might be objected that teachers as part of the intellectual elite are not 
workers per se, in the sense that they do not produce commodities. As 
wage-earners, the teachers who form the subject of this article sold their 
labour power for their own and their children's subsistence and could well 
have been the first completely proletarianized section of the indigenous 
work-force in Zambia. They had six to ten years of formal education and 
two to four years of professional training. They also constituted the bottom 
end of the teaching profession ; their wages and working conditions were 
comparable to the semi-skilled and skilled workers who have received 
considerable academic attention in Africa. 
Generally, labour studies in other parts of Africa have been part of a 
growing scholarly interest in the distinctive role which wage-earners in 
general played in the nationalist resistance, or narrowly as a process of 
labour protest exhibiting class consciousness. The initial studies from the 
1950s to the 1960s saw wage-earners as part of an urban elite which had 
pioneered anti-colonial resistance. 4 Scholars who focused on post-colonial 
conflict between trade unions and ruling political parties stressed that 
workers and their trade unions had been politically uninvolved and con-
tinued to be unresponsive to the demands of the general African population 
and were basically concerned with the articulation of their corporate in-
terest in the wider political system. Articulation of corporate interest in 
this discussion is adapted from Philippe C. Schmitter 5 to refer to the 
ZNUT's institutional relationship with the authoritative decision-making 
institutions represented by the system ·of government in Zambia. This 
relationship involves different structures of power and influence, and each 
unit (here referring to the ZNUT and the government) makes an effort to 
attain its interests . This relationship has found its clearest formulation in 
the concept of "labour aristocracy" systematically treated by Giovanni 
Arrighi and Jolin S. Saul. 6 Drawing their evidence from East and Central 
Africa, they point out that the labour aristocracy comprised high income 
wage-earners who, on account of the security offered by their high wages, 
have become stabilized in urban areas and have severed ties with the peas-
antry. The labour aristocracy enjoyed an income three to five times higher 
4 
'see, for example, J . Wooms, Africa : The Lion Awakes (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1961); R. SANDBROOK and R. COHEN, eds, The Development of an African 
Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action (Toronto : University of Toronto 
Press, 1975), pp. 17-19. 
5 P. C. SCHMITTER, "Still the Century of Corporatism", The Review of Politics, 
36 (January 197 4) : 85-91. 
6 G. ARRIGHI and J. S . SAUL, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (Nairobi: 
East African Publishing House Ltd, 1974), pp. 17-23, 116-26. 
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than the casual or migrant unskilled workers and the peasants. The discre-
tionary consumption of this elite absorbed a significant proportion of the 
surplus produced by the peasants and unskilled workers, which militated 
against increased investment and production in the peasant economy. Arrighi 
and Saul locate the rapid growth of the labour aristocracy in the period 
immediately before and after the attainment of independence, as a result 
of accelerated economic expansion and the localization of the bureaucracy 
in the light of new political imperatives. The most provocative, and also 
probably the most discredited, element in the labour aristocracy thesis is 
their postulate that, through dependence on their socio-economic position 
and use of trade unions, this group identifies upward with the ruling elite 
and foreign capital owners in a process where the indigenous "elite" 
and "sub-elite" are polarized at one end against the unskilled workers and 
the peasantry, instead of the usual relations between workers and the 
bourgeoisie. 
In relating these assertions against the evidence from the teachers' 
strike, we shall bear in mind some of Adrian Peace's strong objections to 
the labour aristocracy thesis, which compelled John Saul to submit a 
reconsideration of the first formulation. 7 The teachers' strike shows, as 
Peace argues for Lagos workers, 8 that they had an organizational capacity 
and class consciousness that operated in a competitive capacity against 
the ruling elites to gain wage increments. The strike was designed to 
promote their distinct interest, an issue not clearly pointed out by Peace, 
rather than necessarily being a means of identifying upwards. This was 
essentially economic corporatism in line with the general policy and 
objectives of their organization to promote and protect the interests of 
the members. Peace also rejects the concept of "labour aristocracy" by 
showing that worker protest in Lagos had a populist impact on the larger 
society. 9 Any populism, as in the teachers' strike, came from other 
workers, not from the peasantry. The populism among the workers took 
the form of worker solidarity and this reflected the workers' common 
position, whose continued articulation led to class polarization not allowed 
for by Arrighi and Saul. Unlike Peace's "populist and militant" workers, 
the nature of the service withheld by the teachers through strike action 
precluded populist reaction beyond the expression of worker solidarity, 
because the larger society was penalized through denial of education to 
pupils. Indeed, the teachers earned incomes several times higher than the 
peasantry and casual workers and did not identify downwards in the sense 
of championing the cause of these sections of society. This is not a mark of 
aristocracy because it is common in Zambia, under the extended family 
system, for workers to invest in their peasant relatives' means of produc-
tion or provide for relatives who are casual workers. There is an insigni-
ficant number of wage-earners who have completely severed ties with the 
7 A. PEACE , "The Lagos Proletariat: Labour Aristocracy or Populist Militants" , 
in The Development, eds: SANDBROOK and CoHEN , pp. 281-302 ; J. S . SAUL, " The 'Labour 
Aristocracy ' Thesis Reconsidered", in ibid . , pp. 303-10. 
8 PEACE, " The Lagos Proletariat", p. 298 . 
9 Ibid ., pp . 290, 297 . 
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rural peasant. However, given the fact that the concept oflabour aristocracy 
was originally formulated to enlist strategies that would alter the neo-
colonial structure of domination, the labour aristocracy thesis has explana-
tory value, as Saul emphasized in the reply to Peace. He asserted: 
The 'structures of domination' in contemporary Africa are such that only 
revolutionary solutions to the development problem seem promising and viable 
ones. Therefore, the main point of interest concerning the role of the working-
class (and concerning the trade unions which claim to institutionalise that 
class's presence in economic and political arenas) must be the extent to which 
the role so played either facilitates or cuts against a radical challenge to the 
status quo of underdevelopment and neo-colonial domination. 10 
Therefore, if this brings out the main element in the reformulated labour 
aristocracy thesis, it has value for pointing out, as we shall see for the 
ZNUT strike, that wage-earners lack a revolutionary ideology, and this 
missing link obstructs the creation of alliances between the minority wage-
earners on the one hand, and the casual workers and peasantry on the 
other. 
Thus, up to the end of the 1960s, labour was studied in the context of 
its corporate interest representation and in relation to political parties and 
elites. In 1975 and 1978, Gutkind, Cohen and Sandbrook edited two works 
by scholars with an interest in African labour history which made a signifi-
cant advance in synthesizing earlier trends in academic research on African 
workers. In them, labour protest is treated as a history of a continuing 
process in which worker action reflects a conscious effort on the part of the 
wage-earners which demonstrates their solidarity in defence of their class 
interest, and this action at the same time has political impact. It is a history 
of protest over "conditions of life and work, and the life of producers vis-
a-vis managers and owners". 11 By stretching labour history to the begin-
ning of imperial intrusion into Africa, they make the important point that 
class consciousness among African workers developed as imperialist indus-
trial activity created wage-earners. They also argue that labour protest has 
existed even where political parties were ineffective, such as during periods 
of military rule and where nationalist parties are proscribed (as in 
South Africa). They have thus extended the horizon both in time perspective 
and scope of the linkage theory from where early researchers had left it in 
the 1960s. They point out that their focus is on "worker-directed per-
spective" in order to establish, through "situationally-specific" features, 
whether awareness of common interest constitutes a social base for 
radical transformation of neo-colonial states of Africa, and whether wage-
earners could be agents of socio-political solidarity for dominated classes 
which mainly comprise the proletariat and the peasantry. 12 It is hoped that 
this study of the 1970 teachers' strike in Zambia will contribute to the 
concerns of a "worker-directed perspective". 
1o SAUL, "The 'Labour Aristocracy"', p. 301. 
11 P. C. W. ·GuTKIND et al., eds, African Labour History (Beverley Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1978), p. 17. 
12 SANDBROOK and COHEN, The Development, p. 16. 
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II. - TEACHERS AND TRADE UNIONISM 
Unionization of teachers at the territorial level dates back to June 
1953, following the formation of the Northern Rhodesia African Teachers' 
Association (NORATA). 13 This was a merger of provincial associations 
which had been formed in the 1940s. NORATA's first president was Joseph 
Mwemba, who held the position up until the time he contested the 1964 
parliamentary elections on the African National Congress (ANC) ticket. 14 
The vice-president was John M. Mwanakatwe, the first African to teach in 
a secondary school in Zambia. On 5 June 1962, NORATA became the 
Northern Rhodesia Union of Teachers (NORUT). 15 The transition from 
association to union status fulfilled a legal requirement that "anyone [sic] 
wishing to fight for better salaries and conditions of service for its members 
must register as a union". t6 
The racial exclusiveness of the NORUT was not a mere accident. 
Northern Rhodesian society, like that in many settler colonies, was racially 
divided and Africans were discriminated against in all walks of life. African 
workers were subjected to an industrial colour bar which restricted them 
to certain jobs for inferior wages. This was a particularly controversial 
issue in the Copperbelt, where the labour force was concentrated in one 
area and thus preoccupied the government. Teachers had played a leading 
role in criticizing the industrial colour bar since 1947, and in 1951 co-
operated with other workers to form a common front, the Northern Rhode-
sia Trade Union Congress (TUC). 17 The TUC was undermined by internal 
conflict over whether workers should take an active part collectively in 
nationalist politics. The conflict indicated a rejection of the artificial 
separation between labour protest and politics by a section of the workers. 
The teachers organized themselves and co-operated with other 
workers because of unsatisfactory conditions that specifically applied to 
the teaching service. African teachers with the same qualifications as 
white colleagues received three-fifths of a European teacher's salary because 
in colonial thinking ''Africans could not work as efficiently as Europeans''. 18 
For example, in 1962 African graduate teachers entered the service at 
about £80 per month compared to £134 per month for European gradua-
13 NORTHERN RHODESIA GoVERNMENT, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
the Stoppage of Work Among Teachers in the Western Province [now Copperbelt Province] 
During the Months of July and August, /963 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1963), p. 5. 
14 John M. Mwemba was a member of the Zambian parliament until he lost in the 
parliamentary elections of 1978. Between 1964 and 1972 he sat as a member of the African 
National Congress. From 1973 to 1978 he sat as a UNIP MP, and held the post of Junior 
Minister in the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. 
15 Interviews , Kapini, 22 january 1977; Zimba, 19 July 1979; John M. Mwanakatwe, 
Elector House, Lusaka, 19 September 1979. 
16 B. P. S. Kapini to Steven Behrstock, 15 November 1975. This letter was shown 
to me by B. P. S. Kapini at the ZNUT Headquarters, Lusaka. 
17 R. M. MwENDAPOLE, History of the Trade Union Movement in Zambia Up to 
/968, Communication No. 13 (Lusaka: Institute for African Studies, 1977), pp. 7, 45 . This 
work was edited and has an introduction by R. H. PALMER and J. R. PHIMISTER. 
18 Interview, Mwanakatwe, 19 September 1979. 
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tes. 19 This racist wage distribution, which applied to all sections of wage 
employment in the country, was a particularly upsetting condition in Afri-
can secondary schools where African and European teachers taught 
together and where the number of African teachers had increased from the 
mid-1950s. Primary school teachers were spared the daily reminder of 
racial income disparities only because their schools did not have Euro-
pean teachers and, of course, Africans were not allowed to teach in 
European schools at either level. African heads of schools did not receive 
administrative allowances . At the secondary school level , the case of John 
M. Mwanakatwe was typical. In February 1949 he became the first African 
to teach in a secondary school, at Munali, which was the only African 
secondary school from August 1940 until the mid-1950s . He received no 
allowance when he became the first African headmaster at Mungwi in 
1957. 20 The educational system was racially segregated until 1964 when the 
new government of independent Zambia desegregated it. However, some 
primary schools became fee-paying and scheduled (multi-racial) schools 
largely attended by the children of whites and of the African elites who 
could afford the high fees. The latter's children were assimilated into 
formerly all-white schools in a disguised perpetuation of the open discrimi-
nation practised during the colonial period. 
Lacking a trade union, teachers sought close association with the 
nationalist movement in order to improve their working conditions and raise 
their professional status in relation to their European counterparts through 
the removal of an unjust colonial system. In contrast to other workers, 
such as the miners who were concentrated in a single work place, the 
fact that schools were scattered made it extremely difficult for African 
teachers to organize themselves and take concerted action . Nonetheless , 
such concentration and easy communication in the Copperbelt facilitated 
the organization of the first teachers' strike there over the colonial govern-
ment's failure to provide electricity in the teachers' houses. 21 The difficulty 
of spatial dispersal in the 1950s was overcome by the widespread anti-
colonial protest, and teachers thus linked their specific struggle to the 
broad-based nationalist movement. They saw participation in the anti-
colonial resistance as the only realistic hope of improving their economic 
conditions , especially as nationalist protest laid emphasis on political rights 
and was oriented to uniting all classes within the African population. 
Mwanakatwe observed that "early leadership of teachers saw close asso-
ciation with nationalist movements as useful in raising the status of 
teachers". 22 The law prohibited all government employees from participat-
ing in any political activity either through official party membership or by 
using union representatives. However, African teachers defied this restric-
tion and took part in nationalist politics "not as a co-ordinated body" 23 but 
as individuals. As such they entered politics in substantial numbers and 
19 NoRTHERN RHODESIA , MINISTRY OF EDUCATION , African Education Circular 
No. 29 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1962). 
2o Interview, Mwanakatwe , 19 July 1979. 
21 Interview, Zimba, 8 August 1979. 
22 Interview, Mwanakatwe , 19 July 1979. 
23 Interview, Zimba, 8 August 1979. 
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have held key positions in independent Zambia, including that of head 
of state. Participation in national politics did not seem to the teachers to be 
a cause for them to form their own political party or to forge an alliance 
with other workers specifically for promoting and protecting workers' 
interests. Those who entered full-time politics did so accepting the broad 
programmes of the various political parties that they joined. Although 
we can consider the teachers' union as a structural corporate unit repre-
senting teachers' interests, the union did not operate beyond the limited 
framework of union "economism" as it did not take any clear political 
initiative. However, it should be noted that teachers in Zambia were bound 
to play an active, in fact, a leading role in nationalist politics. Since teaching 
was the principal occupation among literate African elites before indepen-
dence, members of the teaching profession were accorded high social 
status. 
Before I discuss the nature of teachers' political activity in a broad 
conceptual perspective, the evolution of the teachers' organization should 
be completed. On the eve of Zambia's political independence, the NORUT 
became the non-racial Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) in 
March 1964. 24 On paper, opening its membership to European teachers 
meant a structural transformation which gave the organization a distinct 
class character. In practice, this transformation amounted to little as Euro-
pean teachers received the status of expatriates, i.e. non-Zambians- most 
of them British - working in the country. In order to induce them to 
continue teaching in Zambia, the government offered them better employ-
ment benefits than native teachers. With such advantages, these teachers 
saw no need to join the ZNUT. A further weakness was that the privileged 
indigenous secondary school, college, and university teachers abstained 
from joining the union. The ZNUT failed to realize its aspirations of 
becoming a professional organization for all teachers in the country in terms 
of its membership but remained a union for the defence and promotion of 
teachers' interests. At the time of the 1970 strike, the ZNUT membership 
was 13,000 strong out of 20,000 primary school teachers. About 12,000 
secondary school teachers watched the 1970 strike without organizing 
support for their primary school counterparts. 25 Despite this, the ZNUT has 
carried on with its pre-independence spirit of protecting and promoting the 
interests of all teachers, irrespective of rank and category. This was parti-
cularly evident during the 1964-68 period which was marked by "unabated 
militancy" and what Mwanakatwe calls "unwarranted strike threats", 26 
because expectations for the fruits of independence appeared far from 
being met. Teachers expected and sought an immediate improvement in 
the material conditions inherited from the colonial past. Their social status 
declined with the rapid increase in the zambianization of the civil service 
and the private sector. The more articulate, however, as part of the new 
political elite rose to high positions in the public and private sectors. 
24 J . M. MwANAKATWE, The Growth of Education in Zambia Since Independence 
(Nairobi : Oxford University Press, 1968), p . 122. 
2s Kapini to Behrstock , 15 November 1975. 
26 MwANAKATWE, The Growth of Education, p. 124. Interview, Mwanakatwe, 
19 July 1979. 
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We noted earlier that despite a common organization, teachers 
participated in politics on an individual basis. Sandbrook and Cohen 
considered such political activity by unionized workers in Africa under three 
categories. 27 In their first category they place trade unions that have not 
developed a political consciousness committed to a wider transformation 
of society. While this assertion holds true for the teachers' -union members 
in Zambia, their argument that such a situation allows top union leaders 
to advance themselves or their political patrons in the political structure of 
the state must be modified for the Zambian situation. Among the teachers 
who rose to high political office, the majority were ordinary members 
rather than union leaders . 28 This may largely be due to the fact that teach-
ing was the major occupation of the few literate Africans in a country that 
was one of the richest British colonies but had the least developed educa-
tional system and labour market. The second category of union political 
activity that Sandbrook and Cohen identify relates to a situation where a 
trade union, as a unit in the political arena, attempts to influence govern-
ment policies. It is partly in this context that the teachers' strike should 
be considered. The third type of political activity transcends the concern 
with economistic representation and focuses on wider political issues in 
order to seize state power. Sand brook and Cohen assert that labour unions 
in Africa have always lacked this orientation. As we shall see later, the 
teachers' strike tends to confirm this, and the reasons for this lie in the 
"economistic" tradition and a general acceptance by the teachers and 
politicians in Zambia that trade unions are junior partners or instruments of 
political activity. However, their more sophisticated postulate that worker 
action is a continuing process of conflict between workers and "managers 
and owners" is a characterization that fits the events of the teachers' union 
discussed in this article. 
III. - TEACHERS AND THE STATE 
The first phase of the strikes took place between 29 May and 2 June 
1968. The strike arose from "the question of deductions of rent arrears 
from certain teachers' salaries" 29 in the Copperbelt Province. In March 
1968, the regional headquarters of the Ministry of Education informed the 
ZNUT regional branch that since 1964 some of its members had paid insuf-
ficient rent and that the Ministry now wanted to recover the arrears. 
The ZNUT national executive in Lusaka intervened, asking why the issue 
affected only the Copperbelt Province and why the information had not 
27 SANDBROOK and CoHEN, The Development, pp . 199-201. 
28 Since 1964 more ordinary teachers than ZNUT officials have been elected or 
nominated to parliament or appointed to junior political positions. However, Basil Kabwe 
and Christine Mulundika satisfy the Sandbrook-Cohen case. Kabwe had been a ZNUT offi-
cial in the 1960s, and a ZCTU assistant secretary-general at the time of the teachers' strike : 
he was nominated to parliament in 1973 and was elected to parliament in 1978 from a 
Copperbelt constituency. Mulundika was a ZNUT branch official at the time of the strike and 
was appointed to a junior political post in 1973 , which she has held to date . Her appoint-
ment was ostensibly on the grounds of increasing women's participation in public affairs. 
29 Soko Board of Inquiry , p. 2. 
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emanated from the Ministry's headquarters in Lusaka. The teachers affected 
were to be informed in advance if deductions were to be made. Contrary 
to these arrangements, deductions were made in April and May, taking the 
teachers and the union leaders by surprise. A series of meetings between 
the ZNUT and the Ministry of Education followed. At one of these meet-
ings, held on 28 May, it was decided to appoint a committee to investigate 
the issue. This decision was rather belated: teachers struck work on 29 
May 1968 to protest both the Ministry's disregard for a mutually made 
arrangement and the unfair deductions. Teachers resumed work on 3 June, 
when they were promised that the matter would be investigated thoroughly 
and resolved fairly. 
The government pre-empted the investigation. On 25 June 1969, by 
cabinet decision, the government intervened by appointing an administrative 
working party chaired by Professor C. A. Rogers. 30 The working party was 
directed to consider the issue of rent and the possibility of setting up a 
teaching service commission independent of the Public Service Commis-
sion. The teachers welcomed this intervention as a signal that wages would 
increase and conditions of service improve because the government had 
previously set such a precedent in the handling of the miners' strike in 
1966. 31 However, on 9 October 1968, they were confounded when the 
ministry withdrew recognition of the ZNUT before the working party had 
even completed its investigations. 
The Ministry of Education explained that it took the decision because 
the ZNUT's actions since March 1968 had shown "a demonstratable 
unwillingness to co-operate with this Ministry and indeed can be inter-
preted only as a direct attempt to flout the authority of the government". 
For its part, the Ministry of Education had "punctiliously carried out its 
obligations to the full and this against a growing reluctance on the part of 
the union to co-operate". 32 The Ministry exculpated itself and found the 
ZNUT guilty of "flouting the authority of the government". 
Negotiations over the rent issue ceased until the release of the Rogers 
Report on 30 July 1969. The government accepted most of the report's 
recommendations, abridged them to 147, and identified fifteen of them for 
immediate action. The release of the report was prefaced and underlined by 
a provocative remark by the Minister of Education that, since the recom-
mendations were wide-ranging and called for a large financial outlay, "it 
would be folly to think that everything can be done overnight". 33 No 
3° C. A. RoGERS, chairman, Report of the Administrative Working Party (Lusaka: 
Government Printer, 1969). 
31 GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, Report of the Commission of En-
quiry into the Mining Industry (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966). 
32 D. C. Mulaisho, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education to the General 
Secretary-Treasurer, ZNUT, 9 October 1968, in Soko Board of Inquiry, Appendix I, p. 7. 
33 ZCTU, "Submission to the Three-Man Board of Inquiry in the Dispute Between 
the National Union of Teachers and the Ministry of Education, 20 July 1970", in Soko 
Board of Inquiry, Appendix III (1), p. 3. The ZCTU submission gives an account of the 
strike, its involvement which shows its own and its affiliates' support for the ZNUT. It was 
the most substantial piece of evidence submitted to the Board of Inquiry. 
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immediate action was taken on issues such as rent and salaries that 
directly affected the teachers. The ZNUT began negotiations with the 
ministry soon after the release of the Rogers Report, culminating in a 
new recognition agreement signed on 5 November 1969. 
The actions of the Ministry of Education and the government suggest 
a two-pronged strategy. The ministry adopted a confrontationist approach, 
which the ZNUT challenged. The ministry seems to have believed that, 
as an employer which was part of the government, it had absolute authority 
over its employees and the ZNUT leadership ought to accept this without 
question. This attitude might have arisen from the government's wish to 
bend labour unions to a development policy which entailed avoidance of 
strikes. The ZNUT fought firmly for the interests of its members, especially 
as the government had confirmed that their grievances were legitimate. 
On the other hand, government intervention should be seen as "crisis 
management". The appointment of the Rogers working party was a public 
relations exercise to wiggle out, via public discussion, of a worker-
employer confrontation which directly affected the government. This inter-
pretation is plausible since, soon after the publication of the Rogers Report, 
the government appointed a commission chaired by Reverend C. M. 
O'Riordan to review the salaries and conditions of service of the public 
service, the police, and the defence forces. 34 This was an attempt to find 
a solution to grievances that the teachers' case had shown to have general 
application to the entire public service. The O'Riordan Commission was a 
logical sequel to an administrative investigation that inflamed a controver-
sial issue which had to be defused. Both the government and the Ministry 
of Education found an opportunity to delay implementing and to ignore 
recommendations of the Rogers Report in which the teachers were 
interested. 
In general, governments tend to be sensitive to the grievances of their 
civil servants. They are highly conscious that the civil service is a govern-
ment's most visible and, upon occasion, its only concrete base of support, 
aside from the army, as the events of the 1960s in Africa have demonstrated. 
At whatever cost to the economy, the civil service and the army must be 
kept reasonably content with working conditions, salary and fringe benefits. 
A major feature of the colonial legacy was that the civil service was 
made to feel like the king of the professions; civil servants received better 
pay, housing, and holidays than did teachers, doctors, or any other seg-
ment of the population. Any actions taken by other groups that threaten 
the dominant position of the civil service have seldom been successful in 
any African country. Thus, the majority of African graduates continue to 
knock on the doors of the civil service while the professions, especially 
teaching, are in desperate need of skilled manpower. The situation could 
be corrected by allowing the salaries of professions, especially teachers, 
34 C. M. O'RioRDAN, chairman, Report of the Commission Appointed to Review the 
Salaries , Salary Structure, and Conditions of Service of the Zambia Public Service (including 
the Zambia Police and the Defence Force) (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1971). Hereafter 
O'Riordan Commission. 
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to rise to attract graduates. However, for the civil service this is unthinkable. 
Consequently, governments have put pressure on the universities to 
become teacher training colleges, have bonded students into teaching for 
a specific number of years, and yet failed to correct an · imbalance in 
manpower which could be partly corrected by salary adjustments. 
In Zambia, the Rogers Report indicated to the government that 
teachers were going to have to be given greater financial rewards. If this 
was inevitable, then it was imperative that the civil service and army also 
have their salaries adjusted proportionately upward. Furthermore, a ten-
percent salary rise overall, for example, is likely to cause at least an equal 
rise in inflation, so that very quickly the economic situation is back to 
exactly where it stood before the whole exercise. Usually, the government 
controls the buying of agricultural products from rural areas; it is only here 
where prices can be held below the ten-percent inflationary rise. For 
example, the producer price of maize (corn), a major peasant-produced 
commodity, rose from 3.20 Kwacha in 1970 to 5.00 Kwacha in 1975 when, 
during the same period, wage-earners received two substantial increments 
in 1972 and 1974. 35 At the same time the government had subsidized 
consumer prices for maize meal. The rural areas became poorer as a 
consequence. In many cases, the general salary rise for the civil service 
and army was slightly greater so that the privileged sectors were the only 
real gainers as a result of the initiatives of the teachers. However, the 
teachers do not seem to have been aware that they benefited from the 
state's extraction of surplus from the peasantry. To regard the upward 
identification of the teachers as a typical characteristic of the labour 
aristocracy would be incorrect. It would be more useful to see it as cor-
porate economism since investigations by Rogers and O'Riordan revealed 
the inadequacies of the teachers' incomes and working conditions. These 
might have been severe given the teachers' high dependence on their wage 
incomes. 
The causes of the 1970 strike should be sought in the conflicting 
reactions to the Rogers Report by the government and the Ministry of 
Education on the one hand, and the teachers on the other. These reactions 
also link the 1968 and 1970 strikes. The Ministry of Education looked 
upon the Rogers Report primarily as recommending improvements in the 
administrative structure and efficiency of the teaching service. This was 
confirmed by the ministry's permanent secretary who noted that "the 
advantages of the Report are not to be measured in terms of Kwacha 
and Ngwee in teachers' pockets but in an improvement in the efficiency 
of our education system and the status of our teachers and the quality of 
education our children will receive." 36 Its priority was to improve the 
administrative structure and it swiftly created the Teaching Service Com-
mission independent of the public service. The commission began opera-
35 D. J. DoDGE, Agricultural Policy and Performance in Zambia: History, Prospects 
and Proposals for Change (Berkeley : Institute of International Studies, 1977), pp. 101-2. K wa-
cha and Ngwee are the national currency of Zambia. 
36 Times of Zambia, 10 June 1970. 
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tions in January 1970. The ministry also provided first-aid kits to all schools 
in September 1969, 37 and increased the number of non-teaching and auxiliary 
staff in secondary schools. Almost predictably, the first impulse of the civil 
service was to increase its own size, which apparently did not require 
new budget arrangements. 
The aspects of the report concerning teachers' benefits and wages 
were not given priority on grounds that these had to await budgetary allo-
cations for 1970. Teachers half-heartedly accepted and welcomed the 
ministry's actions. They were more interested in the working party's re-
commendations on rent adjustments, upgrading of salaries, increased in-
service training, promotion, and other general working conditions. As the 
report had been released one year from the appointment of the Rogers 
working party, teachers did not anticipate much delay in the implementa-
tion of recommendations which directly concerned them. By June 1970 
this still remained a false anticipation and frustration among teachers 
peaked. The Lusaka branch of the ZNUT voiced this clearly in May 1970: 
"Teachers are tired of waiting for the implementation of the Rogers Report, 
particularly salaries. You can understand the frustration the ordinary 
teacher is feeling." 38 From the time the Rogers Report was released, 
teachers threatened strike action if implementation of government deci-
sions was delayed. The ministry became apprehensive of increasing strike 
threats despite assurances to the contrary from the ZNUT leadership. At 
the same time the ZNUT pressed the ministry to implement the Rogers 
Report. Renewal of recognition on 5 November failed to improve matters. 
Teachers were dissatisfied with delayed implementation of recommen-
dation.- on rent and housing. The events of March-April 1968 reflected 
inadequate administrative performance because rent arrears had not been 
identified for nearly four years. In June 1970, teachers still paid rent for 
non-rentable accommodation, and were overcharged while others paid rent 
when they were housed in classrooms. The government had accepted the 
Rogers recommendation for refund of rent, but nothing had been done 
by June 1970. As a basis for fair rental charges, the government accepted 
the principle of basing rent on the type of accommodation provided and 
not as a fixed percentage of salary. This was subsequently rejected. 39 In 
general terms, accommodation was unsatisfactory. In urban areas, housing 
was typical of relatively inexpensive, high-density residential accommo-
dation. Most of these homes had no electricity. Even in the Copperbelt 
where the miners were the best-housed workers in the country, accom-
modation for teachers was of comparatively inferior quality. This was parti-
cularly disturbing since teachers compared themselves to the miners who 
had electrified houses for very small monthly charges and a free water 
37 The writer was in charge of a first-aid kit in 1969, at Chizongwe Secondary 
School, Chipata, unaware that the kit was a result of the suffering and struggles of the 
teachers. 
38 Times of Zambia, 28 May 1970; interviews with Elias Mwanza and Margaret 
Mwanza, Mtendere Primary School, Lusaka, 22 July 1979. 
39 Information in this and subsequent paragraphs is in Appendix III (2) of the Soko 
Board of Inquiry . 
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supply. In rural areas most teachers lived in pole-and-dagga thatched 
houses with a kitchen, toilet, and bathroom located outside the house. 
The government accepted to provide the 4AF type of house which com-
prises three bedrooms, a big combined living and dining-room, a kitchen, 
and separated bathroom and toilet inside the building, but can vary for 
bigger families. This was to be an improvement over the two-bedroom 
houses which many teachers occupied. By June 1970 this type of house 
had not been provided and to date accommodation remains a source of 
confrontation between the ZNUT and the Ministry of Education. 
ZAMBIA: LOCALITIES AFFECTED BY 1968 AND 1970 TEACHERS' STRIKES. 
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Teachers were also anxious to see improvements such as payment for 
female teachers on maternity leave, payment of double-session (i.e. teaching 
in the morning and afternoon), substantial increments, especially for the 
bottom four categories on the salary scale which varied between 720 and 
960 Kwacha gross per year, immediate confirmation in appointment after 
two years of service, training of school heads for increased responsibilities 
to manage their schools, regular in-service training and facilities for handi-
capped children with commensurate remuneration for teachers. They 
reacted with misgiving to the appointment of the O'Riordan Commission in 
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1969 because it implied delay in the realization of what they had struggled 
for since 1968. 
As a result, the start of the new academic year in January 1970 was 
characterized by increased and open protest and( strike threats. It was 
clear that a strike loomed. Between January and May 1970, the ZNUT 
executive and the Ministry of Education held six consultative meetings 
to discuss the progress made in the implementation of the Rogers Report so 
as to avert the threatened strike. The meetings were informal, usually 
unplanned and " no records for the meetings were kept". 40 The Soko Board 
of Inquiry later claimed that the decisions of these contacts were not 
communicated to teachers, which served to increase their frustration. On 
13 May, the ZNUT pressed for periodic reports on the progress of imple-
mentation. The first report released on 29 May erred by announcing that 
building new houses, lowering of house rent and leave benefits would be 
deferred. 41 These issues involved money, which the teachers badly needed. 
The Ministry of Education was oblivious to their plight. To force the hand 
of the ministry and the government, the teachers struck work between 2 
and 22 June 1970. 
IV.- TEACHERS' STRIKE, JUNE 1970 
Despite appeals for patience from the ZNUT leaders , the Ministry 
of Education's report on 29 May provoked strike threats from Chilila-
bombwe, a town in the Copperbelt. 42 On 2 June teachers in twenty-two 
primary schools in Mwense District in Luapula Province struck work ; five 
other schools followed on 5 June. From 11 June all teachers in the province 
were on strike, which immediately spread to the nearby Northern Province. 
The Luapula teachers submitted reasons for their strike to the Ministry 
of Education. Most notable among their demands were salary increments 
of fifty percent with effect from 1 January 1969, replacement of old houses 
by the type which the Rogers Report had recommended, electrification of 
teachers' houses , bush allowance for teachers serving in rural schools, 
allowance during maternity leave , remuneration for in-service training , 
and "no more commissions of inquiries". 43 The link between the 1968 and 
1970 strikes is obvious as teachers in Luapula Province used the events of 
the former strike as their baseline. A plea from the Ministry of Education 
on 3 June, and a visit two days later by Newstead Zimba, then acting 
president of the ZNUT, to Luapula Province, failed to end or avert the 
spread of the strike. 44 On 8 June, fifty-four schools involving 806 teachers 
and 74,000 pupils in Lusaka and Kafue in Central Province joined the 
strike, which spread throughout the province between 9 and 11 June, and 
40 Ibid. , p. 3. 
41 Times of Zambia, 30 May 1970. 
4 2 Soko Board of Inquiry, Appendix III, pp. 3-4. 
41 Secretary, ZNUT Kawambwa Branch to Chief Education Officer, 3 June 1970, in 
Soko Board of Inquiry, Appendix IV, p. 5. 
44 Soko Board of Inquiry , Appendix III , p. 3. 
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to Southern Province on 11 June. The strike had become endemic. Kitwe 
and Mufulira teachers in Copperbelt Province struck work on 9 June, and 
on 12 June the whole province was on strike. Western and Eastern Prov-
.inces joined the strike on 12 June, and when the strike spread to North-
western Province on 14 June, all elementary school teachers in the country 
were on strike. 
The strike extended to the whole country (see Map) so rapidly and 
bridged the geographical isolation of the teaching profession in elementary 
schools because of three basic factors. First, the grievances voiced by the 
teachers in Luapula Province were common among primary school teachers 
in the country, with differences of degree rather than substance, espe-
cially between rural and urban areas. Second, there seems to have been 
veiled contact between the national ZNUT leadership in Lusaka and the 
regional branches. As the Soko Board pointed out, private visits by two 
national ZNUT leaders to Luapula and Northwestern Provinces just before 
the strike there broke out may not have been "immaterial" to the strike. 
The ZCTU seems to have sympathized with and supported the teachers' 
cause right from the time their leader was appointed to sit on the Soko 
Board of Inquiry. Moreover, the ZNUT acting president, N ewstead 
Zimba, was also the ZCTU president, and a few ZCTU officers were 
teachers. The third reason for the rapid spread of the strike might be 
located in the press coverage of the initial stages of the strike, statements 
from the ZNUT leaders and the high-handed or boisterous manner in 
which the Ministry of Education handled the teachers' strike threats and 
the actual strike. In all, the strike became the highest expression of pro-
fessional and worker solidarity and a means of securing redress of their 
grievances. 
At a press conference on 8 June the Minister of Education had called 
on the striking teachers to return to work because their strike was illegal. 45 
He claimed he would consider their grievances only when they were 
brought to his attention through the established channels after resumption 
of work. The permanent secretary of the ministry repeated the message in 
a radio broadcast on 10 June. However, the union leaders remained 
convinced that the strike would engulf the whole country "as teachers 
everywhere have the same grievances". 46 At a meeting with the Ministry 
of Education on 10 June, which was also attended by the ZCTU and 
labour officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, the ZNUT 
refused to condemn the strike. In retaliation, the next day the Ministry 
of Education terminated the 1969 recognition agreement "on grounds that 
the ZNUT has to date failed to attract to its membership significant 
representation from scheduled primary schools, secondary schools and 
teacher training colleges". 47 Three leaders whom the ministry had seconded 
to full-time jobs were also recalled and instructed to resume teaching on 
45 Times of Zambia, 9 June 1970. 
46 Ibid. 
47 D. Bowa, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education to the General Secretary, 
ZNUT, 11 June 1970, in Soko Board of Inquiry, Appendix I, pp. 7-8. 
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23 June. No elementary school teachers who went on strike were to be 
paid for the strike period. 
Continued victimization made the teachers even more uncompromising 
and more determined to continue with the strike. This determination was 
summed up on 12 June by Christine Mulundika who explained that "we 
were prepared to return to our classrooms today but the action of the 
Ministry has angered us." 48 The teachers declined to take up the new 
appointments "even at gunpoint" and the ZCTU backed them. 49 The 
ZCTU secretary-general, a former MUZ official, "warned of a general 
strike in the country", claiming that "further victimisation of teachers 
would lead to a chaotic situation". so The assistant secretary-general of the 
ZCTU, a former teacher, informed the teachers of the decision of the ZCTU 
and its affiliated unions when he was reported to have said "we are putting 
the full weight of the Congress to your case." 51 This support for the 
ZNUT in part reflected its previous strong support for other unions. It is 
also significant to note that former teachers were among the leaders of a 
national umbrella organization for trade unions. Also, the ZNUT was 
numerically the second most powerful union after the MUZ, and the third 
financially strongest union after the MUZ and the Zambia Railway Workers 
Union among ZCTU affiliates. At another meeting on 14 June the ZNUT 
and the Ministry of Education agreed to normalize relations , end the strike 
within a week, and not to withdraw the seconded teachers. As a conse-
quence, the strike ended on 22 June, with teachers convinced that their 
grievances would be thoroughly investigated and resolved without any 
further victimization. Just over a week after this compromise and a day 
after the strike ended, the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Educa-
tion issued fresh instructions that the union leaders who had been recalled 
had to take up their new appointments on 24 June and that teachers 
would not be paid. 
The ZNUT and ZCTU instructed the three teachers to ignore the 
ministry's directions and also persuaded teachers not to resume the strike. 
The three teachers were subsequently dismissed on 15 July, for "miscon-
duct" and "refusal to obey lawful instructions". 52 A Minister of State in 
•s Times of Zambia, l3 June 1970. 
49 Zambia News, 14 June 1970. The ZCTU Secretary-General was Wilson Chakulya. 
so Times of Zambia, 17 June 1970. 
s1 Zambia News, 21 June 1970. 
52 Soko Board of Inquiry, p. 4. The teachers who were dismissed were M. Mubita, 
L. Musonda and B. P. S. Kapini. They were reinstated. In 1972 Kapini replaced Mubita as 
Secretary-General of the ZNUT but in August 1980 he was removed following increased 
suspicion among teachers that Kapini had lost his former worker militancy in the hope of 
getting a government appointment. Further intriguing developments include the suspension 
of Newstead Zimba and Frederick Chiluba from the UNIP in early 1981. In 1974, Zimba 
stepped down from the presidency of the ZCTU to be elected secretary-general, a position 
he still holds, and became a ZNUT Trustee in the ZCTU. He was elected to parliament 
in 1978. Chiluba was elected ZCTU President in 1974 and was re-elected in 1978. There 
appears to have been a prearranged understanding among the workers for the 1974 ZCTU 
election for which the 1970 teachers' strike sheds some light. The recent suspensions are 
over the union's opposition to government decision to devolve power to local institutions 
at district and provincial levels through a Decentralisation Bill, passed in late 1980. 
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the Office of the President supported the Ministry of Education but was 
warned by the ZNUT "not to parrot [legal] words which he did not 
understand". 53 
Acrimonious exchanges and confrontations between the Ministry of 
Education and the ZNUT continued until the morning of 30 July 1970, when 
the head of state detained the three teachers plus their acting president. 54 
This action was taken, President Kaunda explained, after "the most careful 
examination of the history, conduct and motives" of the four union 
leaders. They had "misused the responsibilities entrusted to them and had 
sought to turn the union into an instrument for furthering the interests of 
organisations whose objectives are subversive." The teachers were also 
not to be paid for the strike period, apparently, as a penalty for ~'insubordi­
nation and indiscipline". These rationalizations can best be understood in 
an evaluation of the interventions from the ZCTU, the various levels of 
government and the head of state. 
V. - GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
Studies on the MUZ have stressed the constant friction between 
the MUZ and the ZCTU and between the MUZ and the UNIP. 55 The MUZ 
had resisted the ZCTU because it claimed that the latter's leadership was 
hand-picked and used by the ruling party to incorporate and neutralize 
the miners. Up to the mid-1970s the MUZ tried unsuccessfully to replace 
the ZCTU leaders with a leadership that would be more on the side of the 
workers than the existing ZCTU leaders had appeared to be. In the 1970 
teachers' strike the ZCTU confronted the state in support of the teachers 
while the relations between the ZNUT, the ZCTU and the UNIP were of 
a different pattern from those of the MUZ, the ZCTU or the UNIP. The 
present writer is calling for a new assessment of Zambian labour history 
in order to advance our understanding of these relationships and to re-
assess the conclusions on labour history in the country, which have been 
based on the study of mine-workers. In the 1970 teachers' strike the ZCTU 
championed the teachers' cause and through the ZCTU there was general 
support from other unions for the teachers. It would appear that the strike 
marked a watershed in inter-union relationships. From about the mid-
1970s, the ZCTU enjoyed considerable support from its affiliated unions, 
against tne background of increasing economic difficulties in the country. 
Such labour solidarity during the 1970 teachers' strike compelled the 
government not to underestimate the potential consequences of the strike. 
We have seen how the state acted in the teachers' strike at three 
levels: ministerial, cabinet and head of state. I have examined the first two 
53 Times of Zambia, 23 June 1970. 
54 Zambia News, 31 July 1970. 
55 See footnote 2; R. S. SKLAR, Corporate Power in an African State : The 
Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), pp. 205-6. 
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and what remains now is to speculate on why the head of state intervened 
to the extent of detaining four teachers, long after the strike had ended. 
One obvious reason was that heated negotiations continued after the end 
of the strike and another strike was likely. The state intervened to close 
the issue and to reduce controversial events which taxed its attention. 
Widespread support for the teachers frightened the state because the 
continuation of the teachers' unrest might "cause disorder which would be 
costly to control". s6 
The presidential intervention is better assessed when placed in the full 
context of the grounds the President enumerated for restricting the ZNUT 
leadership: 
They sought to tum the union into an instrument for furthering the interests 
of organizations whose objectives are subversive. It was treacherous to delib-
erately seek to mislead the public such as the four teachers had been doing 
in the past. This does not serve the cause of Zambia, it serves the cause of 
enemies within our midst. The greatest enemy in this country is not an outsider 
but a Zambian himself who enables outsiders to succeed in the destruction of 
the nation. 57 
All this is difficult to accept since the President subsequently allowed the 
four ZNUT leaders to carry on with union work when they were released 
at the end of 1970 and reinstated. This was done despite the presidential 
directives that they would only be re-engaged as teachers after five years. 58 
The President's interpretation of the role of the teachers' leaders 
was not unusual because trade unions provide alternative bases for leader-
ship seeking political power. Possibilities existed under the multi-party 
political system (Zambia became a one-party state in December 1972) 
that ZNUT as a unit in the political area, as we have noted earlier, might 
switch the support of its rank and file from the UNIP to another political 
party. Political parties are traditionally not the only institutional bases for 
power. In fact, "strikes do not have to be politically motivated to be 
used by politicians", 59 incumbents, or competitors for control of the state 
apparatus. These interpretations should be judged against the background 
that the teachers' strike took place during a period of intense factionalism 
within the UNIP, the party that has held the reins of state power in Zambia 
since independence in 1964. Political anxiety was widespread in the country. 
A brief discussion of the developments contemporaneous with the 
strike will clarify its significance and place government reaction in a more 
informed context. 60 The first part of the strike took place at a time when 
56 S. D. SACIKA, "The Role of the State in Industrial Relations" , in Some Aspects of 
Zambian Labour Relations , ed . : E. R. KALULA, 1, 1 (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1975), 
p. 57. There was only one publication of this work despite its promising start in an important 
area of contemporary change in Zambia. 
57 Zambia News, 31 July 1970. 
58 Interview, Zimba, 8 August 1979. 
59 C. GERTZEL, "Labour and the State", in Some Aspects , ed.: KALULA, p. 142. 
6° For a more detailed discussion of this theme see, for example, A. MARTIN, 
Minding Their Own Business: Zambia's Struggle Against Western Control (London: 
Hutchinson, 1972), pp. 109-11. 
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the UNIP as the dominant party in Zambia faced growing opposition from 
the African National Congress (ANC), UNIP's pre-independence parent 
and long-time opponent, and the United Party which had been formed in 
1966 by Nalumino Mundia, a previous UNIP lieutenant. 61 The resignation 
of Simon Kapwepwe from the vice-presidency of the UNIP and the state in 
August 1969, and the UNIP altogether late in 1970 and his formation of the 
United Progressive Party in 1971 was a particularly disturbing challenge to 
the UNIP. This was a major event in Zambia's political history because 
two leading national politicians (Kaunda and Kapwepwe) who were close 
personal friends and political allies parted ways. Kapwepwe's resignation 
and speculation that he was forming a new party in 1969 and 1970 influenced 
government reaction to the strike because Kapwepwe was thought to have 
a good following in Copperbelt and Northern Provinces. 62 According to 
Newstead Zimba, the teachers, especially in the Copperbelt, had been sus-
pected of supporting the new party. The waning support of the UNIP was 
reflected in the defeat of many of its candidates during the general elections 
of December 1968 and local government elections in August 1970 in areas 
where the party had usually enjoyed strong support. 
Meanwhile the state's acquisition of fifty-one percent of the foreign-
owned mining industry in August 1969 marked a significant restructuring 
of power and class relations in the country just as the teachers were pressing 
hard for improvement in wages and conditions of service. Government 
participation in the private sector which had begun in 1968 created condi-
tions for the emergence of a local capital-owning class as appointments 
from the top levels of the political and administrative structures to super-
vise government shares allowed those appointed to acquire private proper-
ty. 63 There was therefore congruence of interest between the emergent 
local capital-owning class with the political and administrative elite, as their 
origin and initial consolidation depended on stable ties with those in the top 
echelons of the party and government and stable industrial relations. In 
order that the new developments should become firmly rooted, the govern-
ment imposed a wage freeze and a ban on strikes. The months following 
61 Mundia's party was banned in 1968. He joined the ANC, the official 
opposition in parliament until the formation of a one-party state in 1972. He returned to 
the UNIP when the ANC joined the former in order to make way for a one-party state. 
Under the new political order, he became a member of UNIP's Central Committee, which 
is formally the party's highest administrative and policy-formulating organ. The President 
appointed Mundia Prime Minister on 18 February 1981. 
62 Kapwepwe died of a stroke on 24 January 1980. See his obituary: "How right was 
Kapwepwe ?", in Times of Zambia, 26 January 1980. "It will be difficult not to acknowledge 
that Kapwepwe, whatever his faults in later political life, played a pivotal role in the develop-
ment of Zambia, both as vice-president and as a cabinet minister. What will not be 
easy to decide is whether he was right or wrong in breaking off from UNIP, only seven 
years after the country's independence." 
63 See, for example, K. ERICKSEN, "Zambia-Class Formation and Detente", Review 
of African Political Economy, 9 (May-August 1978): 18-24; T. SouTHALL, "Zambia: Class 
Formation and Oovernment Policy in the 1970s", Journal of Southern African Studies , 7, I 
(October 1980): 91-108. 
A CHAPTER IN ZAMBIA'S LABOUR HISTORY 505 
these restrictions witnessed increasing strike threats among the teachers. It 
became common to identify the growing militancy among teachers with the 
growing political opposition to the UNIP. The campaign for local govern-
ment elections held in August 1970 brought to the surface in sharper terms 
the competition within and against the UNIP so that labour disturbances 
were not to be treated sympathetically. It is in this context that we can 
understand why the government harshly penalized the teachers' leadership. 
The ability of the head of state to end the teachers' strike and the 
quiet submission of the teachers appear puzzling on first sight. Nonethe-
less, it has been a general phenomenon in Africa that governing parties 
have sought to make opposition to themselves appear subversive to the 
state and linked with external forces. On account of the delicate overall 
geopolitical situation in Zambia arising from the war on most of her borders 
since 1964, the Zambian government and people have been particularly 
prone to the acceptance and validity of such an argument. It must also be 
remembered that no national wants to be thought disloyal and subversive 
but governments have made strenuous efforts to confuse the airing of 
genuine grievances with disloyalty and subversion. In some states, Zambia 
included, civil servants and ministers can be and have been attacked while 
the head of state is considered above criticism. The assumption has been 
that he represents the state, is benevolent and cares for the welfare of his 
people, but often is misinformed by corrupt and self-seeking advisers. Thus, 
public protest serves to draw the attention of the head of state to the 
grievances of a section of the people. It is hoped at least that conditions 
will be improved, at most that ministers will be removed and the cabinet 
reshuffled. 
However, more often than not, heads of states inherit the legacy that 
the authority of government must be respected at all times. This legacy 
is reinforced by the legitimacy which ruling parties in Africa draw from the 
fact that they ended colonial rule. Furthermore, rectifying one wrong for 
one group encourages other groups to agitate for and articulate their 
grievances. Finally, the head of state cannot meet the grievances of the 
teachers without affronting the prestige and paramount status of the civil 
service or the army. The usual procedure is the one taken by the Zambian 
head of state. The teachers' leaders are slapped down hard, a commission 
reports, and many of the teachers' grievances are met. For African govern-
ments, this has the advantage of creating the impression that they have not 
been forced into concessions. 
Finally, it should be stated briefly that the O'Riordan Commission 
recommended and the government implemented a salary increase from 
between twenty and fifty percent, the upper percentage affecting the lower 
salary scales and the lower applying to the upper brackets in the teaching 
profession, civil service, police, and the army. This was an important 
gesture which seemingly narrowed the gap between junior and senior 
government employees. However, it was careful not to interfere with the 
prestige ranking of teachers vis-a-vis the other public workers and therefore 
did not help in any significant way to meet Zambia's pressing need to 
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attract more teachers. 64 Among the options open to those qualified, 
teaching was still underpaid. Although we do not have the figures for 
inflation, it seems likely that it wiped out the advantages of the salary 
increases even before they were paid. 
VI. -CONCLUSION 
We have examined the social and economic factors which were res-
ponsible for the strike organized by the ZNUT, the only labour union in 
Zambia's public sector before 1970. The specific grievances of the 
teachers related to patterns of remuneration and general conditions of 
their employment. Strike action, in a bid to secure redress of their 
grievances, brought out worker consciousness. The common feeling that 
united scattered workers transcended a professional consciousness. The 
labour aristocracy thesis would have us believe that the strike was an 
economistic affair, bearing a mark of an upward identification. This would 
be a crude conclusion because the strike represented a real process of 
polarization between the wage-earners and the nascent local bourgeoisie 
firmly located, at the time of the strike, in the political and administrative 
structures of the state. This transitional stage of the emergent bourgeoisie is 
the key in understanding the ruthless manner in which the strike was 
brought to an end. There were no vestiges of common professional feeling 
between the teachers who struck work in 1970 and the former teachers who 
were in bureaucratic positions which they would use to become full 
members of the bourgeoisie. 
Admittedly this event lacked a revolutionary orientation. It did not 
develop a clearly defined political goal, but it induced a political solution. 
Further, no attempt was made to seek alliance with the peasantry (another 
dominated class) or to alter the structure of domination and surplus accu-
mulation in Zambia, which should not detract us from appreciating what 
the strike did. It was a pole around which worker support and solidarity 
crystallized. Inter-union sympathy and support, and reduced conflict 
between the ZCTU and its affiliated unions, characterized the strike and 
has remained an instructive feature of the post-1970 period in inter-union 
relationship. 
64 The teaching profession has dismally failed to attract large numbers of teachers. 
Primary schools are seriously understaffed. It has been estimated that about thirty to fifty 
percent of teacher graduates from the University of Zambia take up secondary school 
teaching. For example, 40 out of 122 teacher graduates in 1979 joined the teaching profession. 
See Times of Zambia, 25 November 1979, Alifeyo Mbuzi to Editor. 
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RESUME. 
Nous nous proposons de faire valoir les motifs qui ont incite les instituteurs 
de Zambie a se mettre en greve en mai-juin /968 et en juin 1970, et, en outre, 
les moyens mis en reuvre par le pouvoir politique pour mettre fin au confiit. Les 
instituteurs ont eu recours a Ia greve dans /' espoir d' obtenir des hausses de salaire 
et de meilleures conditions de travail. Le pouvoir a d' abord tente de resoudre le 
conjlit en noyautant les commissions officielles chargees d' enqueter sur les griefs 
des instituteurs. Ces manreuvres ayant echoue tors de Ia greve de 1970, le pouvoir 
reagit a un climat politique fort difficile en reduisant brutalement au silence les 
chefs du syndical des instituteurs, qu'il fit arreter. Nous situons enfin notre 
demarche dans le cadre general du de bat sur /'elite ouvriere dans /'Afrique 
contemporaine. 
